For the past several decades, life insurance has been used in connection with charitable giving as both a gift vehicle and as a wealth replacement tool. In this white paper, commissioned by Leimberg Information Services, Inc., Michel Nelson from Iowa Savings Bank discusses a new arrangement whereby large numbers of individuals lend their insurable interests to a charity, which through sophisticated premium financing techniques then appears to receive millions of dollars of life insurance at no cost to the charity or the insureds. Next week we will publish Part II in this series, "Charities and Insurance: The Next Big Thing?" by attorney Larry Bell, and then let you decide.
By Mike Nelson
Edited by Steve Leimberg
Life insurance has always been and remains one of the most unique and important of all estate, employee benefit, and charitable planning tools. Unfortunately, because of the inherent complexity of both the product itself and the laws surrounding it, life insurance has been - particularly in recent years - one of the most abused of all planning tools.
The use and abuse of life insurance follows a constant ebb and flow.
FIRST WAVE: CHARITABLE TAX SCHEMES:
Lately, there have been a series of unusual life insurance plans pitched to charities. The first wave involved taxes. Just a few years ago, we witnessed the rapid proliferation of charitable split dollar plans and their mutation into reverse charitable split dollar plans that had a significant tax avoidance/evasion component. They were promptly, fiercely, and successfully attacked by the IRS. (See Addis v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 32 (2002); Weiner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-153.) These plans now reside in the graveyard of futile reduction schemes. But widespread concern remains in Congress, Treasury, and at the IRS about abuses of and by public charities and private foundations.
SECOND WAVE: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING?
The newer wave of proposed plans do not seek current tax deductions. Rather, they are pitched to charities on the premise the charity will receive a cash payment or significant future income without having to invest any money.
Leimberg Information Services commissioned Michel Nelson of Iowa Savings Bank, to draft a special whitepaper on the topic. This is Mike's most informative report.
CHARITY'S ROLE:
The charity provides two main things.
1. Supporters of the charity willing to be "insureds" on policies of life insurance where they will not personally benefit.
2. The use of the looser "insurable interest" statutes that apply to charities when they are the "owners" of life insurance policies insuring the lives of individuals.
LIFE INSURANCE CAN BE LEGITIMATE CHARITABLE PLANNING TOOL:
At the outset, it should be made clear that there are numerous opportunities for charities to appropriately and safely use life insurance within both the letter and the spirit of the law. For example, it is entirely appropriate for a charity to consider life insurance to address the threat posed by the possible death of a key donor. It is also appropriate to consider accepting existing policies as gifts in some circumstances (see Leimberg and Gibbons, Life Insurance as a Charitable Planning Tool: Part I, Estate Planning, March 2002, Vol. 29, No. 3, Pg. 132 and
Life Insurance as a Charitable Planning Tool: Part II, Estate Planning, April 2002, Vol. 29, No. 4, Pg. 196 and Leimberg and Zaritsky, Tax Planning With Life Insurance - 800 950 1216) or to consider a life settlement for policies that the charity might own. (see Breitstein, Joel, Innovative Strategies for Using Life Insurance in Charitable Giving, Estate Planning, Vol. 31, No. 2 (February 2004).)
THE DEAD POOL:
Unlike the viatical industry, where agents and promoters seek out public investors to put up cash to purchase individual existing (or "wet") policies in the hope that an early death will provide an outsize return, the newer charitable plans are driven by more sophisticated pools of individual and institutional capital that see an opportunity to invest in pools of life insurance policies.
As quoted by Bob Plybon, President of the Association for Advanced Life Underwriting (AALU), proponents of this arrangement explain that, ".... the only way to capture the value associated with insurance arbitrage is to turn insurance into a capital markets product." Since the promoters of these pools of capital cannot safely approach individuals and "purchase" their insurability because of insurable interest requirements, they look to use charities as intermediaries to do by indirection what they can not do directly, avoid state insurable interest rules.
HOW NEW YORK'S INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REACTED:
There are infinite varieties of this arrangement but a common theme - the charity gets something for nothing when it provides a pool of individuals willing to indirectly provide a third party investor organization their insurable interest to purchase life insurance.
A description of the general idea is provided in the July 7, 2003 opinion issued by the State of New York Insurance Department in response to the question of, Does this proposal violate New York's insurable interest laws?
"One or more charitable organizations formed under New York or another state's laws and qualifying under sections 170(c) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Sponsor") will form a Delaware statutory trust ("Issuer Trust"). The Sponsors will own the entire beneficial interest of the Issuer Trust, which will be formed as a bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicle solely for the purpose of issuing and offering collateralized endowment bonds (the "Bonds"). The Bonds will be collateralized by guaranteed premium universal life insurance policies ("Policies") and single premium immediate annuities issued with respect to the lives of individuals associated with the Sponsors ("Associates") for the benefit of the holders of the Bonds. At the close of the bond offering, the Issuer Trust will transfer the proceeds from the sale of the Bonds to the Sponsor in an amount sufficient for the Sponsor to purchase the Policies and Annuities. The Sponsor will then immediately assign all benefits and rights under the Policies and Annuities to the Issuer Trust who will in turn pledge such benefits and rights as collateral to a trustee (Trustee) under an indenture of trust (Indenture), for the benefit of the bondholders. The Sponsor remains the owner of the Policies and Annuities and the beneficiary under the Policies and Annuities while the Bonds are outstanding. After the Bonds are paid in full, the Policies and Annuities will be released as collateral and returned to the Sponsor. The transaction will require a pool of approximately 100 Associates (residents and non-residents of New York), each of whom will provide written consent to the Sponsor to purchase, own and name itself as beneficiary of a Policy and otherwise acquire an insurable interest in such Associate's life. Each Associate will also consent to the pledging of the Policy as collateral under the indenture."
The opinion letter found that the proposal was not acceptable under the New York Insurance Law.
WHY ALL THE FUSS?
Charities have a long history of lending their name to commercial entities in exchange for a consideration. For example:
· Credit card vendors issuing cards in the charity's name and using the charity's mailing list
· Providing mailing lists to casualty and property insurance vendors
· Engaging professional telephone solicitors even though only a nominal amount of the funds raised go for charitable purposes
What concerns should be raised if the product involved this time is life insurance instead of the more traditional tie-ups?
1. If significant pools of capital are seeking to engage in life insurance arbitrage, the financial threat to life companies offering mis-priced products is much higher than they are currently facing.
2. The specific aiming of the proposed pools at no-lapse guarantee universal life products almost certainly means that the promoters think that some of them are under-priced. Professor Joseph Belth1 told me that, "The whole thing depends on finding mispriced life insurance policies." Assumed lapse rates are built into the pricing of some of the available product, thereby lowering the premium charged. Where investment pools are involved, those lapse rate assumptions are almost certainly invalid because the decision on whether to continue the required minimum premium payment is not going to be made by individual insureds. In other words the main underlying economic basis of the arrangement and its probability of success (for the charity) is suspect.
3. "Wagering" on human life is contrary to long-standing public policy standards.
4. Charities urging participation by their patrons may harm the donor's personal interests since the death benefit assigned to the donor's life may prevent the donor from getting all of the death benefit coverage he/she might later need for their own personal purposes. In other words, an insurer may decline to issue future personal or business coverage if it knows about large amounts of already existing policies. There is a limit to the amount of insurance an insurance company will issue on any given life.
5. Since the charity's ownership interest in the policies serves as collateral for the underlying bonds, there is a significant (and perhaps intentional) possibility that the charity would either have to put in additional capital at a later date or lose their ownership interest to the investment pool. I say perhaps intentional, because the investment pool could be significantly more profitable if they did not have to share with the charity and if their otherwise taxable investment return could be transformed into tax-free life insurance death proceeds. Congress might view the use of life insurance to benefit private investment consortiums in this manner as a legislative excuse to diminish life insurance's current significant tax advantages under the tax code.
6. Promoters of these arrangements are strongly lobbying state legislators to amend their state's insurable interest laws to make these plans possible. That current legislative push to amend state charitable insurable interest statutes increases the risk to insurers and insureds while only nominally benefiting charities.
7. Tax qualified charities are tax exempt. Ideas that are appropriate and make sense in a non-charitable individual or taxable environment should be viewed with a jaundiced eye by a charity when tax savings are irrelevant.
UBTI AND PRIVATE BENEFIT - IS THERE A PROBLEM HERE?
In considering these charitable life programs, a myriad of issues exist. If a charity is seriously considering participating, they will absolutely have to receive assurances (READ PLR) from competent counsel regarding possible unrelated business tax income (UBTI) and whether the plan violates "private benefit" rules.
This article does not address those issues. I've attempted to focus on the core. How do these plans interrelate with fundamental insurable interest issues? Are they feasible and do they provide more than an incidental benefit to participating charities?
INSURABLE INTEREST - WHAT IS IT AND WHY DO WE HAVE SUCH LAWS?
"Insurable interest" requirements are generally thought of as a public policy arising from repugnance at the thought of wagering on human life. Pending state legislation across the country would gut the insurable interest concept and permit third parties to purchase life insurance contracts on third parties with only the most trivial requirements. (A compilation of the existing state insurable interest laws as they apply to charities is available to members at Leimberg Information Services under the STATE LAWS tab.)
ATTEMPTS TO WEAKEN INSURABLE INTEREST LAWS:
At least part of the explanation for success of those arguing for a loosening of the insurable interest requirement is the inclination of legislators to equate the rationale for insurable interest requirements to the rationale for the control of gambling and other "sinful" behaviors.
Consider the following excerpt from a bill pending in Oklahoma. The mark-up shows changes from the existing law.
State of Oklahoma - 2nd Session of the 49th Legislature (2004)
Committee Substitute for Engrossed Senate Bill No. 522
D. Life insurance contracts and annuity contracts may be entered into in which the person paying the consideration for the insurance has no insurable interest in the life of the individual insured, where charitable if:
1. Charitable, benevolent, educational or religious institutions, or their agencies, are designated as the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof;
2. Organizations or entities to whom a charitable contribution could be made under Section 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code are designated as the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof; or
3. A trust, corporation, partnership, association, limited liability company, or other legal entity approved in writing by a charitable, benevolent, educational or religious institution, or agency thereof, or organizations or entities to whom a charitable contribution could be made under Section 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code with the written consent of the individual insured is designated as the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof.
In no event shall an individual be named as a beneficiary. In making these contracts, the person paying the premium shall make and sign the application therefor as owner and shall designate a charitable, benevolent, educational, or religious institution, or an agency thereof, the institution, agency, organization, or entity described in paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of this subsection as the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the contract. The application or any subsequent change of beneficiary designation shall be signed by the individual whose life is to be insured. These contracts shall be valid and binding among the parties, notwithstanding the absence otherwise of an insurable interest in the life of the individual insured.
With a statute like this, it is hardly difficult to imagine the wholesale marketing of life insurance contracts to insureds for the investment purposes of totally unrelated third parties. In exchange for a cash payment (or a sliver of the death proceeds) to the person being insured and a nominal payment to the charity, it will be possible to do what has long been forbidden - wager on human life.
MURDER SHE WROTE?
The objection is not that wholesale murder will ensue. Such an assertion only trivializes the debate. The objection is that the third party owner of the policy benefits only from the death of the insured. The essence of sound underwriting is that the owner of the policy and the insurer both are better off if the insured continues to live. The proposed changes and attempts to turn life insurance into a third party investment vehicle shatter this harmony and sound philosophy.
Consider this concept in the setting of other types of insurance. Would you sell fire insurance to someone who is in favor of his building burning down because it would greatly benefit him? Would you sell car insurance to someone who announces that he hopes a crash occurs so that he can get a decent car?
A SERIOUS THREAT TO LIFE INSURANCE'S CONTINUED FAVORABLE TAX STATUS!
The second major objection to the assault on insurable interest requirements is that it poses a major threat to the continued favorable tax status of life insurance. If life insurance is transformed into an investment vehicle instead of a system to make-up for a loss, why should it not be subject to taxes in the same manner as any other investment? This would indeed be the case of killing the goose that has consistently laid golden eggs.
WHY IS WAGERING ON SOMEONE'S LIFE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY?
Under English common law there was no prohibition against wagering on someone else's life using an insurance contract. This changed in 1774 with the adoption of the English Life Assurance Act.
The Act was composed of three parts:
· The purchase of insurance on someone was forbidden unless the purchaser/owner had an interest in the life being insured.
· The contract had to include the name of the person or entity on whose account the policy was underwritten and made for.
· Recovery under the contract was limited to the interest of the purchaser in the life being insured.
In 1845, the Gaming Act was adopted. It provided in part that, ".... contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void."
It is useful to look in detail at the seminal case decided by the United States Supreme Court.
A 27 year old tanner entered into an agreement with the Scioto Trust Association. The Association agreed to pay all expenses and premiums for a $5,000 life policy in return for an assignment of the insured's interest in the policy. The Association agreed to pay 10% of the death benefits less certain expenses to the insured's widow. The following year, the tanner died.
The Court opined that:
"It is not easy to define with precision what will in all cases constitute an insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class of wager policies. It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest, arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either as a creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation; for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent, a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful - to protect the life of the insured than any other consideration.
But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some kind of benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured. Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire for the event. They are, therefore, independently of any statute on the subject, condemned, as being against public policy." Warnock v. Davis, 110 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
Consider that under lax insurable interest standards available by using a charitable conduit, such as permitted by the pending bill in Oklahoma, we would have the same situation that the United States Supreme Court condemned above - with one small exception. That exception being that a qualified charity would receive some nominal sliver of the death benefit or cash.
It is to be expected that charities would be "shopped" to find the one willing to accept the smallest possible sliver. The payment would likely be very small, since something is generally perceived to be better than nothing. In weighing the balance, could a few dollars possibly be considered a great enough benefit to society to outweigh the harm caused by losing the protection of insurable interest requirements?
Other US Supreme Court cases have nibbled at the edges of Warnock (see Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911) where an assignment years after the policy was taken out for the purpose of financing a surgical operation was permitted), but the core principle remains intact.
A LOOK AT THE PLANS
Although insurable interest concerns are paramount in this discussion, it is also appropriate to examine some of the charitable life insurance plans currently being promoted. Financial feasibility of the plans ranges from the absurd to near certainty.
One current plan promotes the combination of a single premium annuity and a no lapse guarantee universal life policy. A typical pool would include 100 such policies.
The following illustration was constructed from the actual illustrations distributed by the plan's promoter.
The Charitable *********** and ************** Plan
Male, 75, Standard, Non-smoker
|
5.2%
|
Available
|
||||||||
|
Loan
|
Loan
|
No Lapse
|
|
|
Death |
||||
|
|
Loan
|
Annuity
|
Repay
|
Interest |
Guarantee |
Death
|
Cash to
|
Benefit |
|
|
Age |
Year |
Amount |
Payment |
- Princ. |
Paid |
Premiums |
Benefit |
Charity |
for Charity |
|
start |
1,000,000 |
||||||||
|
75 |
1 |
990,196 |
113,043 |
9,804 |
52,000 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
9,804 |
|
76 |
2 |
979,882 |
113,043 |
10,314 |
51,490.19 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
20,118 |
|
77 |
3 |
969,032 |
113,043 |
10,850 |
50,953.86 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
30,968 |
|
78 |
4 |
957,618 |
113,043 |
11,414 |
50,389.66 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
42,382 |
|
79 |
5 |
945,610 |
113,043 |
12,008 |
49,796.14 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
54,390 |
|
80 |
6 |
932,978 |
113,043 |
12,632 |
49,171.72 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
67,022 |
|
81 |
7 |
919,688 |
113,043 |
13,290 |
48,514.86 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
80,312 |
|
82 |
8 |
905,708 |
113,043 |
13,980 |
47,823.78 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
94,292 |
|
83 |
9 |
891,001 |
113,043 |
14,707 |
47,096.82 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
108,999 |
|
84 |
10 |
875,529 |
113,043 |
15,472 |
46,332.05 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
124,471 |
|
85 |
11 |
859,253 |
113,043 |
16,276 |
45,527.51 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
140,747 |
|
86 |
12 |
842,130 |
113,043 |
17,123 |
44,681.16 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
157,870 |
|
87 |
13 |
824,117 |
113,043 |
18,013 |
43,790.76 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
175,883 |
|
88 |
14 |
805,167 |
113,043 |
18,950 |
42,854.08 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
194,833 |
|
89 |
15 |
785,231 |
113,043 |
19,936 |
41,868.68 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
214,769 |
|
90 |
16 |
764,258 |
113,043 |
20,973 |
40,832.01 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
235,742 |
|
91 |
17 |
742,197 |
113,043 |
22,061 |
39,741.42 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
257,803 |
|
92 |
18 |
718,987 |
113,043 |
23,210 |
38,594.24 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
281,013 |
|
93 |
19 |
694,571 |
113,043 |
24,416 |
37,387.32 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
305,429 |
|
94 |
20 |
668,884 |
113,043 |
25,687 |
36,117.69 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
331,116 |
|
95 |
21 |
641,862 |
113,043 |
27,022 |
34,781.97 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
358,138 |
|
96 |
22 |
613,435 |
113,043 |
28,427 |
33,376.82 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
386,565 |
|
97 |
23 |
583,530 |
113,043 |
29,905 |
31,898.62 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
416,470 |
|
98 |
24 |
552,069 |
113,043 |
31,461 |
30,343.56 |
47,660 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
447,931 |
|
99 |
25 |
471,313 |
113,043 |
80,756 |
28,707.59 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
528,687 |
|
|
100 |
26 |
386,357 |
113,043 |
84,956 |
24,508.28 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
613,643 |
|
|
101 |
27 |
296,984 |
113,043 |
89,373 |
20,090.56 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
703,016 |
|
|
102 |
28 |
202,963 |
113,043 |
94,021 |
15,443.17 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
797,037 |
|
|
103 |
29 |
104,053 |
113,043 |
98,910 |
10,554.08 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
895,947 |
|
|
104 |
30 |
- |
113,043 |
104,053 |
5,410.76 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
1,000,000 |
|
|
1,000,000 |
1,140,079.36 |
1,143,840 |
107,370 |
||||||
In the specific plan above, the promoter recites that the pool will provide $1,000,000 to be used to purchase a single premium immediate annuity (SPIA) that will pay $113,043 annually for the rest of the insured's life.
Funds remaining after payment of the life insurance premium are used to pay interest on the loaned amount at 5.2% and to reduce the principal due on the bonds. A payment of $3,579 is shown as going annually to the charity. I assume that the numbers shown are net of commissions paid to the agent by the SPIA issuer and the life policy insurer. Note: The name of the life insurance companies offering the SPIA and life policy are intentionally redacted, as is the trade name of the illustrated plan.
The illustration provided by the promoter does not include any provision for payment of administrative or trustee fees. This is not realistic. One might assume that the payment shown going to the charity could be for that purpose, except that the accompanying material touts "annual donations to the Donor's charity". Since the illustration provided did include specific issuing companies (although the illustration was an Excel spreadsheet), I checked on the premium recited and found that it was incorrect. I have modified the same basic illustration to reflect the correct premium number of $54,074.
|
Available
|
||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loan
|
at 5.2%
|
|
Flat
|
|
Death |
|
Insureds |
Loan
|
Annuity
|
Available
|
Repay
|
Loan |
|
Death |
Cash to
|
Benefit |
|
|
Age |
Year |
Amount |
Payment |
Funds |
Principal |
Interest |
Premiums |
Benefit |
Charity |
for Charity |
|
start |
1,000,000 |
|||||||||
|
75 |
1 |
996,610 |
113,043 |
3,390 |
3,390 |
52,000 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
3,390 |
|
76 |
2 |
993,043.72 |
113,043 |
3,566.28 |
3,566.28 |
51,823.72 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
6,956.28 |
|
77 |
3 |
989,291.99 |
113,043 |
3,751.73 |
3,751.73 |
51,638.27 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
10,708.01 |
|
78 |
4 |
985,345.18 |
113,043 |
3,946.82 |
3,946.82 |
51,443.18 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
14,654.82 |
|
79 |
5 |
981,193.13 |
113,043 |
4,152.05 |
4,152.05 |
51,237.95 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
18,806.87 |
|
80 |
6 |
976,825.17 |
113,043 |
4,367.96 |
4,367.96 |
51,022.04 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
23,174.83 |
|
81 |
7 |
972,230.08 |
113,043 |
4,595.09 |
4,595.09 |
50,794.91 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
27,769.92 |
|
82 |
8 |
967,396.04 |
113,043 |
4,834.04 |
4,834.04 |
50,555.96 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
32,603.96 |
|
83 |
9 |
962,310.64 |
113,043 |
5,085.41 |
5,085.41 |
50,304.59 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
37,689.36 |
|
84 |
10 |
956,960.79 |
113,043 |
5,349.85 |
5,349.85 |
50,040.15 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
43,039.21 |
|
85 |
11 |
951,332.75 |
113,043 |
5,628.04 |
5,628.04 |
49,761.96 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
48,667.25 |
|
86 |
12 |
945,412.05 |
113,043 |
5,920.70 |
5,920.70 |
49,469.30 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
54,587.95 |
|
87 |
13 |
939,183.48 |
113,043 |
6,228.57 |
6,228.57 |
49,161.43 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
60,816.52 |
|
88 |
14 |
932,631.02 |
113,043 |
6,552.46 |
6,552.46 |
48,837.54 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
67,368.98 |
|
89 |
15 |
925,737.83 |
113,043 |
6,893.19 |
6,893.19 |
48,496.81 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
74,262.17 |
|
90 |
16 |
918,486.20 |
113,043 |
7,251.63 |
7,251.63 |
48,138.37 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
81,513.80 |
|
91 |
17 |
910,857.48 |
113,043 |
7,628.72 |
7,628.72 |
47,761.28 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
89,142.52 |
|
92 |
18 |
902,832.07 |
113,043 |
8,025.41 |
8,025.41 |
47,364.59 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
97,167.93 |
|
93 |
19 |
894,389.34 |
113,043 |
8,442.73 |
8,442.73 |
46,947.27 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
105,610.66 |
|
94 |
20 |
885,507.59 |
113,043 |
8,881.75 |
8,881.75 |
46,508.25 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
114,492.41 |
|
95 |
21 |
876,163.98 |
113,043 |
9,343.61 |
9,343.61 |
46,046.39 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
123,836.02 |
|
96 |
22 |
866,334.51 |
113,043 |
9,829.47 |
9,829.47 |
45,560.53 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
133,665.49 |
|
97 |
23 |
855,993.90 |
113,043 |
10,340.61 |
10,340.61 |
45,049.39 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
144,006.10 |
|
98 |
24 |
845,115.58 |
113,043 |
10,878.32 |
10,878.32 |
44,511.68 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
154,884.42 |
|
99 |
25 |
833,671.60 |
113,043 |
11,443.99 |
11,443.99 |
43,946.01 |
54,074 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
166,328.40 |
|
100 |
26 |
767,558.52 |
113,043 |
66,113.08 |
66,113.08 |
43,350.92 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
232,441.48 |
|
|
101 |
27 |
698,007.56 |
113,043 |
69,550.96 |
69,550.96 |
39,913.04 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
301,992.44 |
|
|
102 |
28 |
624,839.95 |
113,043 |
73,167.61 |
73,167.61 |
36,296.39 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
375,160.05 |
|
|
103 |
29 |
547,867.63 |
113,043 |
76,972.32 |
76,972.32 |
32,491.68 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
452,132.37 |
|
|
104 |
30 |
466,892.75 |
113,043 |
80,974.88 |
80,974.88 |
28,489.12 |
1,000,000 |
3,579 |
533,107.25 |
|
|
533,107.25 |
1,398,962.75 |
1,351,850 |
107,370 |
|||||||
You will notice that the margins get very tight. An increase in borrowing, administrative, or trustee costs of approximately 34 bps on the original amount borrowed will turn the cash flow negative until the insured reaches age 100 - certainly a violation of the lender's collateral requirements.
The same increase would eliminate the availability of any death benefit for the charity until the same age - 100. The actual illustration obtained from the insurance company using the corrected $54,074 premium shows a -0- cash value at all times based on a minimum interest rate and maximum charges and a -0- cash value by year 17 (age 91) using 5.70% for 20 years, then 6.05% thereafter with current charges.
Using the same insured details, the annual premium cost from the particular AAA insurer I asked was $85,486.94 for a no-lapse guarantee (NLG) to age 100 - a NLG was not available past 100. Clearly, policy costs differ.
Where there are pools of multiple policies, consider the significant cost and difficulty of tracking the insureds. How are you going to know when they die? Probably the only practical way to do it is to reserve a significant death benefit for them so that the family will advise the current owner of the death event. Sharing the death benefit will further diminish any possible profitability of the plan.
THERE ARE LIES, DAMN LIES, AND EXCEL SPREADSHEET LIES
What Benjamin Disraeli might have said in 2004
Not all of the plans being pitched reach the feasibility level of the foregoing plan. The following plan was presented to a college development office that in turn sent it to me for comment. In summary, the proposal provided that:
· The college would provide 1,000 insurable donors who were willing to apply for a $250,000 universal life policy.
· The college would be the owner and beneficiary of the policies.
· The promoter would provide full financing in the total amount of $5,700,000 at 7% per annum that would cover all costs incurred including the promoter's upfront fee of $800,000 and an upfront $400,000 going to the lender/trustee. The college was not required to provide any funds and would not be responsible for the amount borrowed. The loan would be collateralized solely by the insurance policies.
Unlike the proposal discussed above, this plan just doesn't work. There simply aren't any insurance companies offering policies like the 1,000 described in the illustration provided to the college. (The illustration is stacked vertically in two pieces to fit the available width and maintain a reasonable type size.)
|
Death |
|
Cash to |
Policy Cash |
||
|
Benefits |
Premiums |
Charity |
Value |
||
|
Start |
|||||
|
End of Year |
1 |
354,364 |
4,340,300 |
0 |
2,541,802 |
|
End of Year |
2 |
557,130 |
0 |
36,913 |
2,330,551 |
|
End of Year |
3 |
903,469 |
286,433 |
58,034 |
2,391,806 |
|
End of Year |
4 |
1,105,692 |
555,115 |
94,111 |
2,439,196 |
|
End of Year |
5 |
1,268,118 |
650,045 |
100,000 |
2,638,262 |
|
End of Year |
6 |
1,462,214 |
582,443 |
200,000 |
2,375,174 |
|
End of Year |
7 |
1,701,835 |
650,743 |
200,000 |
2,086,559 |
|
End of Year |
8 |
1,967,698 |
642,681 |
200,000 |
1,692,755 |
|
End of Year |
9 |
2,269,725 |
853,389 |
400,000 |
1,393,111 |
|
End of Year |
10 |
2,614,446 |
1,085,956 |
400,000 |
1,336,310 |
|
End of Year |
11 |
2,955,282 |
1,802,792 |
400,000 |
1,406,927 |
|
End of Year |
12 |
3,297,136 |
1,850,459 |
600,000 |
1,401,722 |
|
End of Year |
13 |
3,766,312 |
2,175,726 |
700,000 |
1,643,592 |
|
End of Year |
14 |
4,321,149 |
2,280,034 |
700,000 |
1,566,597 |
|
End of Year |
15 |
4,752,287 |
2,694,250 |
1,500,000 |
1,603,711 |
|
End of Year |
16 |
5,173,884 |
3,618,008 |
3,810,080 |
1,469,143 |
|
End of Year |
17 |
5,507,190 |
3,899,441 |
1,607,749 |
1,442,292 |
|
End of Year |
18 |
5,826,659 |
4,170,904 |
1,655,755 |
1,465,451 |
|
End of Year |
19 |
6,138,049 |
4,894,592 |
1,243,457 |
1,254,545 |
|
End of Year |
20 |
6,428,815 |
5,062,011 |
1,366,804 |
969,224 |
|
End of Year |
21 |
6,705,955 |
5,531,686 |
1,174,269 |
1,076,957 |
|
End of Year |
22 |
6,963,723 |
4,860,204 |
2,103,519 |
923,538 |
|
End of Year |
23 |
7,198,409 |
5,370,326 |
1,828,083 |
1,119,700 |
|
End of Year |
24 |
7,398,003 |
5,763,587 |
1,634,416 |
1,175,858 |
|
End of Year |
25 |
7,637,877 |
5,652,762 |
1,985,115 |
1,257,213 |
|
End of Year |
26 |
8,770,541 |
6,037,253 |
2,733,288 |
1,027,720 |
|
End of Year |
27 |
8,858,409 |
5,041,433 |
3,816,976 |
935,839 |
|
End of Year |
28 |
8,706,900 |
5,019,535 |
3,687,365 |
787,595 |
|
End of Year |
29 |
8,514,530 |
5,645,735 |
2,868,795 |
539,703 |
|
End of Year |
30 |
8,350,463 |
5,751,268 |
2,599,195 |
402,677 |
|
End of Year |
31 |